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1 Introduction: The regulatory state and its discontents
The interpretation of the EU as a regulatory state is meant to be an alternative to integration 
theories that see the EU either as a federal state in the making (supranationalism) or as a set 
of government agencies controlled by the member states as principals 
(intergovernmentalism). Majone (1993a, 1996) interpreted the EU as a regulatory state in 
the sense that the EU has become effectively a ‘fourth branch of government’ which acts as 
an independent agent or even as a trustee of national democracies. Majone’s theory of the 
regulatory state is functional and normative, implying that the EU has been invented for 
good governance of the multi-level executive, specifically to enhance the credibility of 
governments’ commitment to open markets. Majone (1996) draws on the observation of 
the rise of the regulatory state in the U.S. Yet, there it has been the result of a power 
political struggle between the Presidency and Congress, in which Presidents successively 
gained control rights over the federal bureaucracy from the legislature and established a 
‘managerial presidency’ (Pildes and Sunstein 1995: 11-15). This raises the question how 
fundamental the economic rationale for the regulatory state really is.
Skeptics point out that even if the regulatory state would live up to its normative function, 
it amounts to prioritising commercial interests and economic policy goals over concerns for 
collective welfare and social safety. There are at least two complementary variants of this 
skepticism which prove relevant for the U.S.-EU comparison. There is a political-
institutional variant that criticizes the ‘democratic deficit’ implied, for instance in the 
disguise of a ‘negative integration bias’ (Scharpf 1999).  This bias stems from the need for 
super-majorities in the Council to counter the liberalizing stance of the Commission which 
in turn favours the removal of market barriers over coordinated market regulation. This 
entrenched pro-competition thrust arguably does not reflect the democratic consensus in 
most member states. 
Another skeptic variant is the socio-economic critique that has its roots in Karl Polanyi’s 
(1944) analysis of the ‘Great Transformation’ which claimed a direct link between the 
emergence of capitalist markets for labour and other ‘fictitious commodities’ on the one 
hand, and the catastrophes of the first half of the 20th century, on the other. After the war, 
economic processes have been ‘re-embedded’ in social reproduction and, thanks to 
generous public welfare and institutions of corporatism, capitalism and (social) democracy 
in Europe were reconciled (Esping-Andersen 1990: 36-54). European integration therefore 
makes sense as a way of safeguarding this post-war settlement under conditions of 
globalizing markets which have the potential of undermining these de-commodifying and 
embedding arrangements (Caporaso and Tarrow 2008: 1-2). Yet, the regulatory state may 
be a Trojan horse of globalizing market forces.
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In contrast to these two criticisms, I do not see the regulatory state as an overpowering or 
encroaching level of government but as a differentiated governance function that mature 
democracies may find useful to develop. Yet, there is nothing that forces them to develop it 
and this governance function may be politically too controversial since a market bias and 
‘disembedding’ is indeed its very core. The creation of the regulatory space consists of 
separating public interventions that can be justified on economic grounds, notably 
efficiency-enhancing allocation or systemic stabilisation, from those that can be justified on 
political grounds, above all redistributive norms. It is based on the view that policies that 
are positive-sum games, ie increase the pie for society – such as free trade, fiscal prudence 
or environmental protection -- need parliamentarian approval only as regards their 
(uncontroversial) goals. The detailed implementation is and should be left to expert 
deliberation and the oversight of courts, so as to avoid special interest group politics to 
distort their implementation. Redistributive policies, by contrast, are zero-sum games, 
taxing some and giving subsidies or transfers to others. Hence, by their very nature, 
redistributive policies are in need of majoritarian decision-making, subject to some 
protection of minorities against exploitation, say in the form of high taxation. 
In contrast to Majone’s original concept, this paper has as a point of departure that the 
creation of the regulatory state is a contentious political process and that there is no 
overriding functional imperative that would make it succeed in the long run. In fact, this is 
the message of a special issue on ‘The politics of conflict management in EU regulation’, 
to be published as issue 4 (July 2009) in West European Politics (Mabbett and Schelkle 
2009). The contributors analyze instances in which regulation under an economic 
imperative has to be asserted continuously but remains contested (Susanne Schmidt on the 
Services and Posted Workers Directive), instances where economic regulation has to 
concede some space for the pursuit of social and developmental goals (Michael Blauberger 
on state aid, Achim Kemmerling and Eric Seils on taxation) as well as instances where the 
creation of a regulatory state failed (Deborah Mabbett on occupational pensions, Dorte 
Martinsen on health care services). But there are also cases in which regulatory state 
building has made deep inroads into policy areas traditionally considered to be about 
redistribution and hence taboo (David Natali on Open Method Coordination of public 
pensions, Waltraud Schelkle on budgetary policy). 
In line with the framework outlined in Mabbett and Schelkle (2009), I will analyse to what 
extent the regulatory state has developed, taking the EU as a benchmark and compare it 
with the United States. Then I will look at the response of these fiscal unions to the 
ongoing crisis. If the critics of a democratic deficit, a negative integration bias or social 
disintegration are right, we should see the regulatory state either retreat because crisis 
management requires the dominance of budgetary-distributive politics. Or the regulatory 
state asserts itself to the detriment of effective crisis management, mainly with constraints 
on government intervention that would lead to large increases in public debt. The latter is 
what well-known economists have accused the EU of, contrasting its supposedly timid 
response unfavourably with that of the U.S. Treasury (eg Blanchard 2009, Buiter 2009, 
Krugman 2009, Wyplosz 2009). The conclusions sum up my findings.
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2 The regulatory state in fiscal policy: The EU and the US 
contrasted 
This section analyzes how the EU regulatory state has expanded into fiscal surveillance and 
how this contrasts with the U.S., a contrast that is more subtle than is often acknowledged. 
I look at a) the construction or formulation of the regulatory problem, b) the use of 
regulatory techniques, in particular information management, and c) the empowerment of 
delegated authority. 
2.1a) The formulation of the regulatory problem in the EU
The attempt at regulatory state building in fiscal policy can be seen in the emphasis on a 
conspicuously economic rationale, rather than a political. In the EU, externalities or 
‘spillovers’ of member states fiscal policies was initially the overriding argument for some 
coordination in the Council1 and the surveillance of each member state’s compliance 
delegated to the Commission. The Dublin Presidency Conclusions (1996: par.18) which 
decided on the institution of a Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) summarized the rationale 
thus: ‘Sound government finances are crucial to preserving stable economic conditions in 
the Member States and in the Community. They lessen the burden on monetary policy and 
contribute to low and stable inflationary expectations such that interest rates can be 
expected to be low.’ Monetary and financial market integration was taken to create free-
riding incentives: members enjoy low risk premia on the common interest rate and thus 
find borrowing cheap; current account deficits that are largely incurred with other members 
of the monetary union cannot lead into currency crises; and each fiscal authority may 
speculate that the central bank is reluctant to counter the inflationary pressures from 
excessive deficits by rising interest rates because she would have to punish the defecting 
and the compliant members alike. Fiscal rules had to prevent these incentives from 
materialising (Public Finances 2004: 127-128). 
The underlying assumption that the incentive for freeriding was pervasive justified an 
explicit ‘no-bail out’ clause in the Treaty (Art.104b, Art. 103(1) in the consolidated Treaty) 
and responsibilities for fiscal policy devolved to the national level: a common budget 
would have only increased the moral hazard. The original Pact therefore focused on the 
fiscal envelope, concentrating on the general government deficit (which is the net or 
consolidated borrowing requirement of national and sub-national governments and social 
insurances). It must not exceed 3 percent except for severe recessions, so as to contain an 
explosive growth of public debt (preferably below 60 percent of GDP) and hence the 
spillover on interest and inflation rates. This would leave enough room for the automatic 
stabilisers, built-into the tax-transfer systems of member states, to do the main job of 
stabilising asynchronous cycles and country-specific shocks, thus minimising the need for 
discretionary, politically motivated intervention (Artis and Buti 2000). The structure of 
spending and taxation was left for national democracies to decide. 
Moreover, the stick of an Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) was needed to sanction 
governments that break their commitment repeatedly (Public Finances 2004: 127-128). It 
should be noted that all EU members have to comply with the major stipulations of the Pact 
1 Either in ECOFIN, the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers of the EU, or the Council’s sub-
formation Eurogroup, made up of the Economic and Finance Ministers of Euro area member states.
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– specifically to avoid an ‘excessive’ deficit and to have a budget ‘close to balance or in 
surplus’ over the medium-term, that is the entire business cycle. But a non-EMU member 
that violates the excessive deficit rule cannot be fined under the EDP and no country can be 
punished for violating the Medium-Term Objective. 
In the revision of the Pact in March 2005, the original separation of the policy problem into 
allocation (overall deficit to prevent negative externalities) and redistribution (budget 
structure to implement choices over the secondary income distribution) gave way to a 
‘sustainability’ rationale. To be precise: macroeconomic fiscal discipline has become more 
and more justified on reasons of long-term viability while the spill-over rationale for fiscal 
surveillance lives on in the control of state aid.2 This shift in emphasis can still be 
construed as concerned with efficiency and stability, namely the efficient allocation of 
fiscal resources between generations that does not need to take recourse to inflation. 
However, this shift has extended the mandate of fiscal surveillance to the structure of 
member states’ budgets, specifically to control ‘age-related spending’ on pensions, public 
health, long-term care and education. This has massively increased information 
requirements as outlined below. At the same time, the EDP has been considerably 
weakened, by providing exemptions like systemic pension reforms or a sustained period of 
low (not negative) growth that governments can invoke – under specified conditions – to 
postpone or repeat steps towards pecuniary sanctions.
The sustainability rationale is a long-term goal that does not require emergency measures, 
agreed upon by Council summits in the spotlight of the mass media. Instead, this goal shifts 
emphasis on how to account for the contingent and implicit liabilities in budgetary 
accounts, measures that are too technical for continuous scrutiny by the mass media and 
agreed upon in low-key consultations between fiscal experts. This has not ‘de-politicized’ 
EU fiscal surveillance because the attempt at forcing governments to consider the 
consequences of their budgetary decisions over a long time horizon and in considerable 
detail is potentially a nuisance and a challenge to their sovereignty they will resist. But 
resistance then comes in the disguise of sloppy reporting and fiscal gimmickry, rather than 
in the form of conspicuous arm twisting of Council members.3 
2.1b) The formulation of the regulatory problem in the U.S.
The U.S. regulatory state in fiscal policy is obviously not as easy to locate as there is no 
SGP for its monetary union. To make the task manageable, I take the comparison with the 
EU as a lens through which the formulation of the regulatory problem is identified. This 
lens directs our attention, first, to the fiscal rules from which I infer whether there is an 
underlying perception of a regulatory problem, ie whether there is an economic rationale 
2 In Memo /05/195, the immediate answer to the question for the basic rules of state aid policy reads: ‘State 
aid policy is an important part of EU competition policy. State aid control comes from the need to maintain 
a level playing field for all undertakings active in the Single European Market, no matter in which Member 
State they are established, and to avoid Member States getting locked into a contest where they try to 
outbid each other to attract investment.’  I come back to this in the section on the financial crisis.
3 The latter is what Germany and France managed in order to avert an EDP in November 2003. This led the 
Commission to take the Council to Court which annulled the Council conclusion in July 2004 and triggered 
a revision of the Pact in March of the following year. For an overview of the evidence on fiscal gimmickry 
see Schelkle (2007: 727-730).
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for constraints on budgetary policies. Second, the EU comparison directs our attention to 
the role of federal oversight over state spending. 
The use of fiscal rules is an apparent similarity between the EU and the U.S. at the 
(member) state level, from which we can infer the understanding of the underlying policy 
problem.4 Virtually all U.S. states have balanced budget rules (NASBO 2008: table 11), at 
first sight resembling the non-enforceable ‘close-to balance or in surplus’ rule in the EU. 
But these balanced budget rules in U.S. states apply annually5 and there is no spending 
without appropriation, hence no need for an EDP.  These balanced budget rules relate to 
the operational budget only, ie to current revenue and expenditures. Capital outlays for 
multi-year public investments may be debt-financed but then debt or debt service limits 
apply. They are neither as pervasive nor as uniform as the 60% rule in the EU, however 
(NASBO 2008: table 12). Typically they are capped (debt must not exceed a particular 
dollar amount) or tied to revenues (debt service or debt level must not exceed a certain 
share or small multiple of current revenues), not to state income. Finally, two thirds of 
states have expenditure or revenue limits, typically restraining their growth to general 
income or population growth. Revenue increases often require a supermajority of 2/3 or 3/5 
of the legislature (NASBO 2008: table 13). 
The nature off these fiscal rules suggest that their aim is not to avoid spillovers of fiscal 
policy in a monetary union: the rules are neither harmonized nor is there a federal agency 
that is responsible for their enforcement. This is left to state legislatures that are not 
preoccupied with the wellbeing of the union as a whole. Nor does long-term sustainability, 
the containment of an explosive debt dynamic, seem to be an equally prominent motive of 
fiscal regulation, given that there is no consensus on debt limits and they are not tied to the 
fiscal capacity of states as determined by Gross State Product or total taxable resources 
(GAO 2004: 4). It seems more pertinent to interpret these rules as being concerned with the 
prudence of fiscal policy. The norm of prudent fiscal behaviour asks state governments to 
observe a budget constraint on living expenses analogous to private households.  Even debt 
(service) limits can be justified in this way in that future generations should not inherit debt 
because their predecessors/ parents lived beyond their means. Keeping debt service 
payments within bounds prevents the need for higher taxes. 
The isolation of a policy problem of prudent fiscal behaviour may or may not be 
regulatory, ie it may or may not have a conspicuously economic rationale which 
democracies have a hard time to uphold. Golden Rule type restrictions that contain debt 
finance to public investment can have an economic-regulatory rationale. For instance, they 
can be based on arguments that public demand and debt may crowd out the private sector’s 
demand, and that future expenditure may have a higher return than present expenditure on 
infrastructure because needs are less uncertain and technological progress leads to a better 
4 There has also been a balanced budget rule for the federal budget, the so-called Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
Act of 1985. The Act did not achieve its aim of a balanced budget by 1991 and was replaced by the Budget 
Enforcement Act in 1990 and the Balanced Budget Act in 1997, which required to offset the costs of new 
legislation instead of focusing on the deficit directly. When the federal budget got into surplus since 1999, 
the constraints on new programmes were circumvented and the Act expired in 2002. All three Acts were 
congressional initiatives (Savage and Verdun 2007: 847-857). 
5 In some states, a deficit may be carried over to the following year (NASBO 2008: table 11).
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cost-benefit ratio. However, economic rationales do not figure very prominently in the 
legislative and constitutional provisions for balanced budget rules and debt (service) limits. 
The borrowing limits in U.S. states originated in the 19th century when financial excesses of 
governments led to widespread default on state bonds. Their idea is to constrain 
government power generally: “Constitutional debt limitations were part of a general 
movement that entailed also restrictions on the length of legislative sessions, and the 
salaries of state legislators, and should be understood in these terms.” (Eichengreen and 
von Hagen 1995: 12) 
In other words, these rules are the tangible expression of  political liberalism and its 
support for small government even if this requires to forego some benefits of public 
intervention. In fact, strict balanced-budget rules are known to be counterproductive for 
counter-cyclical stabilisation in that they create boom-bust cycles to contain borrowing and 
makes the fiscal impetus of state budgets overall pro-cyclical (NASBO 2004, Follette et al 
2008), a feature that the ‘close to balance or in surplus over the cycle’ rule of the EU tried 
to avoid but finds hard to enforce. The moral hazard problem is located in the relationship 
between the electorate and the government of the day, not in the one between states. The 
sanction for non-compliance with the fiscal rules is that there will be no appropriation for 
state-run programmes or public investment because state legislatures will not pass the 
budget. 
There is no explicit federal bailout for states (Eichengreen and von Hagen 1995: 12), yet 
this is only superficially similar to the EU. There is disaster relief and temporary fiscal aid 
that the federal government may grant in times of economic recessions (GAO 2004). The 
budget stabilization funds that virtually all states maintain are often non-existent or quite 
limited, for instance capped to not exceed 10% of current revenue, and hence are too 
limited for smoothing expenditure and revenue in a prolonged down-turn (NASBO 2008: 
table 19, 50). The use of temporary fiscal aid is unrestricted and allocated on the basis of 
population size, ie per capita, not on the basis of fiscal capacity or need. If anything, this 
federal stand-by worsens the moral-hazard problem in that state governments may not care 
for building up sufficient rainy day funds, a critique that has been levelled repeatedly 
against federal antirecession aid and disaster relief (GAO 2004: 5). It is exactly for this 
reason that the EU has abstained from any support for member states in recession, 
supposedly so as to force them to good, precautionary governance. 
Federal fiscal oversight in the U.S. is strictly tied to budgetary flows, ie the federal 
administration can attach strings only to transfer programmes by which it is funding states. 
The oversight over state aid is left to courts.6 The strings attached to federal grants are in 
turn controlled by the appropriations committees of Congress.  For instance, two major 
programmes for elementary and secondary education, the No Child Left Behind Act and 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, condition federal aid on the requirements, 
respectively, that school districts design and implement statewide achievement tests and 
prepare individualized education plans for disabled children (CBO 2005: 3). Such 
stipulations are attached to all big federal programmes, such as social assistance under 
6 Under the so-called ‘dormant Commerce Clause’ to which we come back in the section on the financial 
crisis.
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TANF (Temporary Relief for Needy Families) and Food Stamps. Congressional 
appropriations bills are more detailed and extensive than in any other OECD country, 
parliamentary control ‘often dictates specific management decisions’ (Blöndal et al 2003: 
25).  Hence, the U.S. government ends up regulating particular expenditures but not the 
fiscal envelope for the members of the monetary and fiscal union. But unlike the ‘age-
related’ spending categories in the budgets of EU member states, the policy problem thus 
addressed is one of political accountability to federal taxpayers, not a concern for the long-
term economic viability of the union. 
2.2a) Regulatory techniques of control in the EU
As indicated, the Pact was originally based on the ‘two nominal anchors of the Pact - the 
3% of GDP reference value for the deficit ratio and the 60% of GDP reference value for the 
debt ratio’ which are ‘the centre piece of multilateral surveillance’ (ECOFIN Council 2005: 
3). These anchors signaled the arms-length nature of fiscal surveillance, that subsidiarity 
was observed, and that the only issue of common concern was the debt dynamic in member 
states’ public finances. If this had remained the state of affairs, we could hardly speak of 
the emergence of an EU regulatory state in fiscal surveillance, the Pact would simply 
resemble a legal constraint on debt or deficit levels that many countries have given 
themselves.7
It is the annual Stability and Convergence Programmes (S&CP) that are a paradigmatic 
regulatory state instrument – Stability programmes have to be submitted by EMU 
members, Convergence programmes by non-EMU members of the EU. For instance, new 
governments are ‘invited’, after they have taken office and submit the first update of their 
Programme, ‘to show continuity with respect to the budgetary targets endorsed by the 
Council on the basis of the previous update of the Stability/Convergence Programme and -
with an outlook for the whole legislature - to provide information on the means and 
instruments envisaged to reach these targets by setting out its budgetary strategy’ (ECOFIN 
Council 2005: sect.1.4) This requirement treats the most sensitive political issue for an 
incoming government as a matter of common administration, urging it to take a view of a 
non-majoritarian agency with a time horizon that is not determined by considerations for 
the electoral cycle. 
S&C Programmes are based on a non-binding ‘code of good practice’ that gets its force 
from the peer review in the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC, the COREPER 
equivalent for the ECOFIN Council) and the ECOFIN Council itself. Moreover, it can be 
taken up by national parliaments. For instance, the UK government was pressed about the 
Council’s Opinion on the UK's programme by the House of Commons’ Select Committee 
on European Scrutiny, an Opinion ‘which suggested dissatisfaction about data provided by 
the Government’ (Select Committee 2006: par.4.2). Such examples of parliamentary 
scrutiny are, however, rare in practice.
7 In the OECD/ World Bank database on Budget Practices and Procedures, 29 out of 40 countries 
responded in the affirmative to the question 2.1.a.1: ‘In developing the budget, are there fiscal rules placing 
limits on Executive fiscal policy discretion?’ See http://ocde.dyndns.org/ and Public Finances (2007: part 
II.5) for results from this dataset for 9 EU countries. The majority of rules is enshrined in the constitution or 
a budget law, not in political ad hoc agreements.
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The Commission has vigorously gone down the route of ever closer supervision and 
detailed data collection, with mixed success. A case in point is the ‘quality and 
sustainability of fiscal policy’ agenda. It was launched in 2000 at the Lisbon Council which 
asked the ECOFIN Council and the Commission to present a report to the Spring Council 
of 2001 on ‘the contribution of public finances to growth and employment’. The report was 
duly prepared by DG Ecfin and the two Committees that bring together the top civil 
servants from economic and financial ministries in member states, the EFC and the 
Economic Policy Committee (EPC). This ‘new step in the fiscal policy agenda of EMU’ 
(Public Finances 2001: 45) consisted mainly of looking not only at the level of the budget 
but also at its composition. 
DG Ecfin and the EPC in particular have since then engaged in a Herculean effort to 
operationalise the notion of quality and sustainability of public finances. There is obviously 
no consensus on how to measure the quality of a budget since ‘available classifications of 
“productive” expenditure in the EU range between 5 and 44% of total public expenditure, 
depending on which expenditure categories are seen as “productive”.’ (Public Finances 
2004: 181) New data requirements were added to the Code of Conduct. The informal 
Ecofin Council of April 2008 discussed the quality issue again based on a Task Force 
report that asks for more budget information, such as breaking down all government 
expenditures into 68 classifications (Kastrop 2008: 24). At this stage, it is not obvious what 
this quality agenda has added to fiscal surveillance beyond additional reporting obligations. 
In the assessment of the S&CP, the Commission hardly ever comments on a country’s 
statements in the quality section.
This is arguably different for the sustainability aspect. It gets considerable attention in the 
Commission assessments of the S&CP and is the subject of high-profile reports. There is 
an Age Working Group attached to the EPC that brings together experts from the 
Commission and the member states to develop and refine a common methodology for 
sustainability projections, the accounting for implicit liabilities from pension entitlements 
etc. Two more sustainability indicators with an explicit economic and policy rationale have 
been used since 2004 and they are estimated for two different scenarios to deal with the 
uncertainty underlying long-term projections. In the S&CP, the revised Code of Conduct 
asks governments to project over a 50 year time horizon ‘the government expenditure 
categories which are most affected by demographic changes, that is, old-age pensions, 
health care, long-term care for the elderly and education, as well as the assets set aside to 
cater for the ageing-related increase in expenditure.’ (Public Finances 2006: 82) These 
projections must be consistent with the common long-term projections by the Commission 
and the Age Working Group. A Sustainability Report was prepared by the Commission 
Services and the EPC at the request of the Council. It was submitted by the end of 2006 
and contains the age-related expenditure projections using models of national authorities 
but based on commonly agreed assumptions about population and economic developments 
(European Economy 2006: 7). The EU regulatory state is now developing a methodology 
for estimating the implicit liabilities in member states’ budgets and make them the basis for 
calculating the country-specific MTOs under the revised Stability Pact (Public Finances 
2007: 82). 
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The economic assessment of sustainability is not a straightforward, technical task, 
however. For instance, it is not obvious whether a similar stock of public pension 
obligations relative to GDP in Poland, 287% in 2006, is more, less or as sustainable as in 
Germany, where it was 289% in 2005 (CMFB 2008: 9). An assessment would have to 
make precise numerical assumptions about the life expectancy of retirees, future growth of 
the tax base, the appropriate discount rate for countries in or out of the Euro area etc. In 
long time series as these, results are extremely sensitive to small changes in the underlying 
assumptions. 
If it is economically no less problematic to assess fiscal sustainability than to evaluate the 
growth quality of budgets, the difference in prominence between the two is all the more 
significant. With respect to the quality aspect, fiscal surveillance seems to be on shaky 
ground as it can be seen as interfering with political priorities of national democracies. It is 
also of little strategic relevance for budgetary decisions in member states: nobody can hold 
governments accountable for generating too little growth. The pursuit of sustainability, by 
contrast, can claim to tackle market and government failures. It has become a highly 
technical process of estimating sustainability indicators and implicit liabilities. Interviews 
confirmed that Treasuries watch this with some trepidation as the esoteric exercise in 
indicator construction seems to be driven by a clear intention to come up with new 
accounting rules for pension entitlements. The revised Pact has prepared the ground for this 
uncomfortable extension of the regulatory state. 
2.2b) Regulatory techniques of control in the U.S.
The use of fiscal rules restraining political discretion over revenue raising and public 
expenditure is even more prevalent in the United States than in the EU. This setting of rules 
may be seen as a regulatory technique since it imposes strict parameters on the discretion 
of policymakers and legislatures that can be justified on economic efficiency grounds. But I 
have argued that the rationale seems to be political, namely to rein in state expansion even 
if the economic effects are counter-productive. 
There is no U.S. equivalent to the annual Convergence or Stability Programmes that 
ministries of finance in the EU have to submit for scrutiny by the Commission and peer 
review in the ECOFIN Council. But U.S. states and the federal government use a number 
of other techniques that have been developed or are in line with prescriptions of New 
Public Management. Performance budgeting is the most prominent and defined as 
containing three elements (Blöndal et al 2003: 31): first, an explicit statement and 
quantification of outcomes/ outputs for each programme, agency or ministry; second, 
managerial flexibility and less emphasis on input controls; and third, some link between 
outcomes/ outputs and funding. The U.S. was a front-runner in developing performance 
budgeting, 25 states practice it, typically in conjunction with other budgeting techniques. 
Even more states have performance measures at the programme or agency (ministry) level 
and 41 publish these performance measures online (NASBO 2008: tables 14-15). For the 
federal government, performance budgeting has been prescribed by law in the Government 
Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993. It requires each agency (department, 
ministry) to come up with performance measures. 
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So far performance budgeting results in a collection of agency documents, there is ‘no 
whole-of-government plan’ (Blöndal et al 2003: 32).8  This regulatory technique has 
predictable limitations when its effectiveness relies on powerful legislatures making use of 
it: ‘While the executive branch has made great strides in generating performance 
information, GPRA has not lived up to the rhetoric associated with its passage, and 
Congress has failed to make performance a significant factor in the budget decision-
making.’ (Blöndal et al 2003: 30) The shift to results-based budgeting would imply a 
considerable shift of power to the executive overseeing performance at the cost of the 
legislative overseeing conformity with legislation ((Blöndal et al 2003: 28). Not 
surprisingly, Congress has resisted this move to the regulatory state in fiscal policy. This is 
unlikely to be different at the state level, even though it has become firmly institutionalised. 
In 39 states, performance measures have to be included in an agency’s budget request to be 
passed by state parliaments (NASBO 2008: table 16). But again, state legislatures are 
reluctant to base their decisions on performance measures (GAO 2005: 9-11). 
One is reminded of the ‘quality of fiscal policy’ agenda that the EU pursues without 
generating more than new information requirements that are of little strategic value for 
fiscal allocations in practice. Two noticeable differences are, however, that in the U.S. this 
attempt of ‘budgeting by results’ is ultimately directed at parliaments and that there is a 
strict separation between state and federal level. In the EU, this exercise is led by the 
executive (some Treasuries) and directed at the executive (the Council), aiming at EU 
guidelines on how member states should allocate budgetary resources. These differences 
correspond to the contrast in the revealed perception of the fiscal policy problem: in the 
U.S., it is accountability to taxpayers that revenue has been spent prudently, in the EU it is 
the sustainability of national public finances on which the viability of the union supposedly 
rests.
 
The use of projections is less wide-spread and uniform in the U.S.. Many states require by 
statute some revenue projection beyond the current budget cycle but only oil-revenue 
dependent Alaska requires to extend this projection over 10 years, most call for revenue 
projections between 1 and 4 years (NASBO 2008: Table 7). In addition, two thirds of U.S. 
states ask for forecasts of current expenditures and in 34 states this includes all 
programmes, not only particular agencies. But the time horizon never exceeds 5 years 
beyond the current budget cycle and is shorter in most (NASBO 2008: table 30). Again, 
this regulatory technique is aligned with the goal of ensuring prudence and accountability 
to current taxpayers and voters. The projections cannot provide a corrective for the short-
termism of representative democracy as they are arguably meant to do in the EU regulatory 
state. 
8 ‘Agency’ here means any government entity, from ministry (‘department’) to operating body of a 
programme (Blöndal et al 2003: 42).
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2.3a) The empowerment of delegated authority in the EU
The authority for EU fiscal surveillance is split between the self-regulatory ECOFIN 
Council, including the Eurogroup consisting of economic and finance ministers of the Euro 
area only, and the delegated regulator in the guise of the Commission. Within the 
Commission, DG Ecfin is responsible for fiscal governance and Eurostat for statistical 
governance, both reporting to the same Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs. 
Most observers have interpreted the revision of the Pact in 2005 as revealing a fundamental 
problem of delegated authority. In this view, the Council does not come in harshly enough 
because of its self-regulatory features (‘The turkeys deciding on the menu for Christmas’). 
Delegated authority has been further weakened by the ‘escape clauses’ introduced into the 
EDP. The perception of participants is somewhat different. For those inside, a standoff in 
the Council is full of political drama. Interviews with Treasury officials suggest that such 
standoffs are a real threat and civil servants have failed seriously in their duty if the 
Finance Minister is not amused. My interpretation sees the Pact revision as a further step in 
regulatory state building. The spillover rationale proved too political in the sense that it 
required to call on the Council as adjudicator of first resort each time a country incurred a 
budget over 3 percent of its GDP. The threat of opening an EDP, at a time when a country 
was typically in recession and public finances in dire straits, made this a very salient issue 
that could hurt a government domestically. The politically salient adjudication in the 
Council has now given way to a low-key process in which fiscal and statistical experts talk 
to each other more often. For instance, every country that is about to be notified under 
Article 104 for an excessive deficit will be visited by a special mission beforehand, at the 
level of the Commissioner or the Director General of DG Ecfin. 
EU fiscal surveillance is characterized by an internal division of labour between the 
policymaking arm, DG Ecfin, and the technical arm, Eurostat. While the policymaking role 
depends on a plausible economic justification, the technical role depends on controllable 
statistical measures. The two are not always compatible. Eurostat’s role has gone largely 
unnoticed in the literature, except for the excellent primary research by Savage (2005). Yet, 
in legal terms, Eurostat is a more authoritative regulator than DG Ecfin. Its rulings on the 
European System of Integrated Economic Accounts (ESA), in particular on how certain 
transactions affect the deficit or debt of general government, constitute secondary case law, 
are final and cannot be overruled by the Council (Savage 2005: 62; 192). If a member state 
refuses to comply by new accounting rules, Eurostat can decline certification of its 
biannual reports which constitutes a breach of the Maastricht Treaty and can trigger an 
EDP. Eurostat has done this in the case of Portugal and France (Savage 2005: 149). 
Eurostat’s role was strengthened even more in 2004, when a Statistical Code of Conduct 
was issued in response to misreporting by the Greek authorities. It strongly endorses 
independent statistical assessments. Eurostat now has a mission to Treasuries at least every 
two years, but is allowed to visit any time in between. Eurostat has thus become an 
‘independent auditor’ as one Treasury official put it in an interview. This ‘auditing 
dimension’ evolved over time and is remarkable since it was not intended in the original 
set-up (Savage 2005: 52, 43-44). 
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Eurostat’s authority and autonomy is backed up by a strong advisory body, the Committee 
on Monetary, Financial and Balance of Payments Statistics (CMFB). This committee 
consists of the representatives of national statistical institutes and national central banks of 
the European Economic Area, including Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, with observer 
status for candidate countries like Turkey and supranational institutions like the IMF and 
the OECD. The CMFB is ‘the premier body within the statistical community for setting 
policy on the requirements and methodologies in providing statistical services to the EU’ 
(Savage 2005: 63). The CMFB has become such a powerful body that some Ministries of 
Finance tried to replace their national statisticians on the committee; yet Eurostat and 
national statistical institutes managed jointly to fend off these demands (Savage 2005: 64).
The run-up to EMU was dominated by Eurostat’s decisions on how fiscal transactions 
account towards deficit and debt reduction -- or not.  DG Ecfin managed to ‘get back into 
the game’9 after 1999, in particular through the structural (cyclically adjusted) 
measurement of deficits. This requires econometric methods and economic models that are 
not the realm of statisticians. At the request of the ECOFIN Council in May 2004, DG 
Ecfin developed the production function approach to cyclical adjustment which it argues 
has a sound economic, not merely statistical, foundation (Denis at al 2006). Another way 
for DG Ecfin to assert its role is to base fiscal surveillance on projections, rather than 
historical data for which Eurostat is responsible. The sustainability and quality agenda 
requires exactly that. Projections make more economic sense since prevention is the goal, 
yet their inherent uncertainty makes them less suitable for regulatory control. 
DG Ecfin is seen by some member state governments as interested in directly influencing 
policymaking rather than in the technicalities of budgetary surveillance (Savage 2005: 52; 
177). An example for this tendency of DG Ecfin to stretch its regulatory role to the limit 
was the proposal to synchronize budgetary calendars between EU and national levels. In an 
overwhelming majority of countries, the draft budget is endorsed by the government and 
submitted to parliament between September/ October. The S&CP are prepared 
simultaneously and then submitted so that the ‘programmes are examined by the 
Commission and the Council only after national budgets have definitively been passed by 
national authorities.’ (Public Finances 2007: 69) DG Ecfin wanted to make the S&CP ‘a 
real ex ante-process’ by shifting their submission to before summer, and shortly after the 
medium term planning for all economic policies under the Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines (BEPG) is finished: ‘[T]his step could be envisaged as the national transposition 
into a national perspective of the multi-annual guidelines provided in the BEPGs [..]. In 
that way, the BEPGs and the opinions on the programmes would provide the framework 
for the preparation of national budgets by governments and for its final adoption by the 
parliament.’ (Public Finances 2004: 127)  This proposal would constitute a step away from 
regulatory state building towards fiscal federalism with shared budgetary responsibilities 
and national parliaments as the principals of the process. Bringing national parliaments into 
the process would undermine the claim that EU fiscal surveillance is mending failures of 
national democracies but address the ‘democratic deficit’ in EU fiscal surveillance. This 
9 This is a quote from a DG Ecfin official in Savage (2005: 148).
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proposal was not included by the Council in the revision of the Pact and interviews in 
Treasuries do not suggest that any efforts go into changing budgetary calendars.10
The difference between Eurostat and DG Ecfin highlights opportunities and limitations of 
the regulatory state in fiscal surveillance.  Eurostat is quietly harmonizing fiscal accounting 
all over Europe, even beyond EU borders, while mostly escaping public attention, even in 
the scholarly literature. It has achieved this by using the advisory process to its advantage 
in that Eurostat’s decisions go with the majority in the CMFB, bringing national technical 
experts on its side (Savage 2005: 142). Secondary legislation thus looks as if it were 
generated by an apolitical regulatory process, built on a consensus enshrined in ESA and 
continuously developed in rational deliberations. By contrast, the attempt at ‘blinding with 
science’ by DG Ecfin, adding ever more sophisticated data and reporting requirements has 
little strategic value for domestic policymaking. Nor does it attract the interest of national 
parliamentarians even though DG Ecfin has tried to offer itself as a faithful agent for the 
joint monitoring of governments by proposing to streamline budgetary calendars.
2.3b) The empowerment of delegated authority in the U.S.
The contrast between the two federations or multi-governance systems is quite stark in this 
respect. The U.S. has regulatory agencies for budgetary policy both at the federal and the 
state level, but in contrast to the EU the fiscal regulators are confined to either the federal 
or the state administration and they have to share their power of oversight with the 
parliament, ie Congress or state legislatures. Finally, the ‘managerial presidency’ is not 
confined to regulatory-allocative intervention in contrast to budgetary-redistributive tasks, 
unlike the EU Commission. This raises the question whether the set-up for the delegation 
of authority is compatible with a regulatory state interpretation at all.
The powerful Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is the incarnation of the U.S. 
regulatory state in fiscal policy (Pildes and Sunstein 1995: 14-16; Blöndal et al 2003: 12). 
For the budgetary process, this independent agency in the presidential administration 
assumes the policy-making functions that in most countries are assigned to the Treasury.11 
The OMB initiates the federal budgetary process in April, 18 months before the respective 
fiscal year starts, by issuing a letter to all ministries (‘departments’) specifying funding 
levels and management issues, such as the need for performance measures (Blöndal et al 
2003: 11-15). Ministries make their requests for funding to the OMB by September. They 
receive information about budget totals from the OMB by November against which they 
can appeal; the final decision lies with the President. In December/ January, the OMB and 
the departments finalise budget documentation. The President’s budget proposal goes to 
Congress before the second Tuesday of February. There the requests have to go through the 
almighty appropriations committees for each department, in both the House and the Senate. 
10 Two years later, the Commission finds that the involvement of national parliaments in preparing or 
endorsing the S&CP is minimal. In three quarters of all member states, the programmes are not voted on or 
not even submitted to parliament. Just a minority of about one in five member states attach the programme 
or a preliminary version to their draft budget law (Public Finances 2007: 70-71).
11 The Department of the Treasury is concerned with the daily cash management of the federal government 
and plays a secondary, perhaps even tertiary role for policy-making, given that the Council of Economic 
Advisors is also part of the Executive Office of the President (Blöndal et al 2003: 14, 47). This has 
dramatically changed in the crisis since October 2007.
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The parliament has six months to pass the budget that starts on 1 October. The OMB then 
has ‘a key role to play in overseeing the co-ordination and management of the entire 
executive branch for the President’ (Blöndal et al 2003: 12). 
The OMB thus combines the policy-making functions of a ministry and the regulatory 
functions of an agency with considerable managerial flexibility. The director of OMB is a 
ministerial level position and a member of the President’s Cabinet (Blöndal et al 2003: 12). 
As indicated above, the regulatory state in the U.S. originated in the institutional power 
play between Presidency and Congress (Pildes and Sunstein 1995: 11-16). ‘[T]he President 
and the Congress “co-manage” the executive branch.’ (Blöndal et al 2003: 39) In this co-
management, the President is ex officio a guardian of the welfare of the Union, even if 
elected not in the same sense prone to electoral politics as a member of parliament who 
represents a particular constituency, an electoral district in the House or a state in the 
Senate. Once the budget is passed, the OMB plays an analogous regulatory role to the EU 
Commission, monitoring the compliance with detailed rules at the programme and agency 
level.12 It is the meta-regulator of programmes run by federal agencies and ministries, 
especially through its Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). But the 
combination with a leading role in the preparation of the President’s budget and a 
presidential review process of agencies’ performance has made the OMB a controversial 
body (Pildes and Sunstein 1995: 24-28), prone to politicization analogous to the Council in 
its regulatory function. 
The federal budgetary process led by the OMB is not synchronised with the budgetary 
calendars of the states. It was mentioned that the federal fiscal year begins in October while 
in most states it begins in July, so ‘federal revenue or spending changes may affect 
decisions already enacted by the states.’ (NASBO 2004: 9). This creates considerable 
uncertainty for state budgets (Blöndal et al 2003: 51-52). On the revenue side, states have 
complete autonomy on taxes but ‘for simplicity’ they have tied some state taxes to federal 
laws so that changes in federal taxes may also affect state revenues. On the expenditure 
side, about one quarter of all state and local spending stems from the 600 categorical and 
block grants that the federal government sends. These grants can be both matched and 
unmatched but the largest programmes have to be matched by state funds, for instance 
Medicaid which accounts for 40% of all federal grants to subnational governments. Rainy 
day funds can be used to compensate for unexpected shortfalls in tax revenue or federal 
grants.
The solution to this interdependency between fiscal levels has, as far as I know, never been 
sought in a synchronization of budgetary calendars. Rather, legal provisions are meant to 
contain the largest source of uncertainty for state budgets, namely unfunded federal 
mandates.13 It prohibits federal legislation to that effect. It is a matter for parliaments and 
12 The closest comparison would be state aid or accounting rules in the EU, enforced by DG Competition or 
Eurostat, respectively.
13 Since 1995, explicit unfunded mandates are prohibited and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) is 
required to screen legislation to determine whether it mandates unfunded spending by states if likely costs 
exceed a certain threshold. Some programmes, in particular Medicaid, are exempt from such screening 
(NASBO 2004: 9). Any member of Congress can raise ‘a point of order’, that is object to a piece of 
legislation which might violate the prohibition of placing an unfunded mandate on lower levels of 
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their supporting budget offices, not the executive, to internalize the externalities of multi-
level policy-making and an expression of an inherent distributive conflict: ‘Because of 
constraints on state spending, the federal government is often a release valve for states as 
they try to shift state-funded costs to the federal government principally in open-ended 
entitlement programmes. Cost shifting happens in reverse as well. As new federal funds 
have been scarce, the federal government has tried to mandate spending in sub-national 
governments to address national goals.’ (Blöndal et al 2003: 51) It is remarkable that only 
the cost-shifting in reverse is constrained, formally and explicitly. 
2.4 Summary
Table 1 summarizes the last three sections and indicates, somewhat to my own surprise, 
that there is a more developed regulatory state in fiscal surveillance in the EU. The EU 
regulatory state in the making addresses more explicitly problems of fiscal governance in 
national democracies. In the U.S., regulatory state building in fiscal policy has not really 
separated out a ‘fourth branch of government’ but is introducing New Public Management 
type of regulatory techniques into budgetary politics at most. It is thus more an attempt at 
rationalizing the budgetary process with its strong role for legislatures and reaches across 
government levels only to a very limited extent. 
Table 1: Summary of the contrasts between regulatory states in fiscal policy
European Union United States
Formulation of 
the policy 
problem
Regulatory: Internalising 
spillovers from profligate state 
fiscal policies; long-term 
sustainability of each national 
fiscal policy 
Only partly  regulatory: Prudence 
in the sense of matching current 
expenditure with current revenue 
and limiting debt burden for future 
generations
Regulatory 
techniques
Stability and Convergence 
Programmes; Statistical Code of 
Practice; fiscal rules; long-term 
projections; regular consultations 
between EU and national fiscal or 
statistical experts
Performance budgeting at federal 
and state level; fiscal rules (but 
goal not regulatory); medium-term 
projections 
[federal oversight tied to budgetary 
relations]
Delegated 
regulatory 
authority
DG Ecfin and Eurostat;
Council as adjudicator of last 
resort (after Pact revision)
Office of Management and Budget 
(after federal budget has passed)
The fiscal constitution of the United States arguably limits its ability to develop a 
regulatory state in budgetary surveillance: the federal budget is the elephant in the room of 
state fiscal policies, financing about a quarter of all state expenditure and helping them out 
with federal loans when they cannot meet their balanced budget requirements. To guard 
their sovereignty, states will therefore not accept much oversight from the federal 
executive. This is left to strong legislatures. In the EU, it is the states that have big fiscal 
government; such a point of order can only be waived with a majority in Congress (Blöndal et al 2003: 22). 
In addition, representations of state interests in Washington, DC, ‘monitor federal actions that may impact 
on state finances.’ (NASBO 2008: 3)
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muscles. The budget control rights of national parliaments vary widely but tend to be 
weaker than in the U.S. (Public Finances 2007: part II). An EU regulatory state in fiscal 
surveillance has arisen whose powers of general inspection exceed anything that the federal 
government in the U.S. can exercise (Sbragia 2004: 59). This is hard to explain for any 
comparison in terms of fiscal federalism; one would have to take recourse to questionable 
conjectures, for instance that for some reason EU member states do not guard their 
sovereignty as jealously as U.S. states. My interpretation is rather that the EU regulatory 
state is not a competing government level but a branch of government, possibly a nuisance 
for other branches but reined in by a functional division of responsibilities. It is politically 
contested but typically within the executive rather than between governments or between 
executive and legislature.
3 Fiscal policy in the EU and the U.S. contrasted: Responses to the 
crisis
The financial and economic crisis since October 2007 is a stress test for any fiscal 
framework that wants to ensure ‘economically sound’ or ‘prudent’, in contrast to politically 
expedient, budgetary policies. At the time of writing in March 2009, no government has 
found a way to stop the crisis despite considerable fiscal resources devoted to it. My 
interest here is to analyse whether the contrasting responses can be traced back to the 
extent to which the regulatory state manages to commit governments to economically 
justifiable policies – assuming that democracies have problems to keep such commitments. 
Three issues seem to be relevant for this analysis and I put them deliberately in terms that 
support crisis management by the regulatory state:
1. Are there explicit or in-built precautions against distributive, interest group and 
electoral politics or is ‘pork-barrel’ the price to pay for getting crisis management 
approved quickly?
2. Are there observable attempts at keeping the debt dynamic and contingent liabilities for 
future taxpayers within bounds or is short-term crisis fighting, ‘gambling for electoral 
resurrection’, the order of the day?
3. Are there ways of forcing members to take the union’s welfare into account when 
designing  interventions or is there little to stop protectionist or discriminatory 
measures of member states? 
3.1 Precautions against distributive politics
Explicit precautions against distributive politics taking over crisis management can be seen 
in attempts at following economically sensible, agreed guidelines and ask for transparency 
in the allocation of funds. The Obama administration has set up a dedicated website14 
which allows to track the use of funds (of $787 billion over two years, of which $275 
billion go to the states) from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), 
signed into law in mid-February 2009. Apart from the usual guidance by the OMB which is 
developing standard terms and conditions for all grants and contracts, a Recovery 
Accountability and Transparency Board has been created which entrusts a board of 
inspectors general with overseeing the disbursement of funds by federal agencies. The 
European Economic Recovery Plan (€200 billion in 2009), agreed in mid-December 2008, 
14 At URL: www.recovery.gov
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is much more decentralised, basically adding up and providing a common framework for 
what member states spend to fight the crisis in 2009. The EU budget provides only a 
fraction of this sum (€30 billion). The Commission is more engaged in preventing policy 
disasters, such as the competitive offer of deposit insurance or discriminatory support for 
national car industries, proposing common guidelines for the recapitalisation of banks and 
coordinating emergency support to some new member states like Hungary and Romania. 
DG Ecfin maintains a dedicated website15 that has a chronology of measures taken at 
member state level and approved by the Commission, mostly under the pretext of state aid 
rules but also under the Stability Pact.
An in-built precaution against distributive politics dominating crisis management is 
reliance on automatic stabilisers, ie budget items that make the fiscal balance vary counter-
cyclically with booms and recessions without the government taking discretionary action. 
Ceteris paribus, automatic stabilisers are more effective the larger the size of government, 
the more progressive the income tax system, and the larger the share of cyclically 
responsive budget items such as corporate taxes on profits or unemployment benefits. On 
all these accounts, Europe’s more generous welfare states and more burdensome tax states 
do structurally better than the U.S. (OECD 2005: 20-25).16  Table 2 gives the contribution 
of automatic stabilisation, based on the latest OECD measures for the counter-cyclical 
responsiveness of budgets to a 1% change in the output gap and estimated output gaps 
2008-2010 by the IMF. For reasons of clarity, only the biggest EU member states are listed, 
counting for about 80% of EU GDP. The budgets of European countries are about 25-40% 
more responsive than in the United States and the comparison with similar output gaps in 
Italy shows how much difference this makes. This is also due to the fact that the stabilising 
effect of the U.S. federal budget is partly undone by the pro-cyclical effect of state and 
local fiscal policies (Follette et al. 2008). The EU budget has to be balanced annually, 
hence does not vary with the business cycle and is, at about 1% of GDP, in any case too 
small to make a difference. 
15 At URL: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/focuson/focuson13254_en.htm 
16 General government expenditure in the U.S. is about 30% of GDP, below the OECD average of over 
40%. The federal government counts for two thirds of all public spending, states for the other third 
(Blöndal et al 2003: 52).
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Table 2: Estimated Contribution of Automatic Stabilisation (as % of GDP)
Overall budget 
responsivenessa
2008 2009 2010
OGap AutStab OGap AutStab OGap AutStab
France 0.53 0.0 0.0 -2.2 -1.2 -2.5 -1.3
Germany 0.51 1.1 0.5 -1.1 -0.5 -1.5 -0.8
Italy 0.53 -1.2 -0.6 -3.5 -1.9 -4.0 -2.0
Spain 0.44 -1.2 -0.5 -4.7 -2.1 -6.2 -2.7
UK 0.45 0.3 0.1 -2.4 -1.1 -3.3 -1.5
USA 0.33 -0.3 -0.1 -3.6 -1.2 -4.2 -1.4
Source: OECD (2005: table 9), OECD (2008: table 10), own calculations
a  Sum of the elasticities for corporate, personal income and indirect taxes, social security 
contributions and for all current expenditure (mostly unemployment compensation).
OGap Output Gap is the deviation of actual output from estimated potential output, as % of potential 
GDP, published by the OECD in November 2008.
AutStab Automatic Stabilisation, ie the estimated annual change of the budget balance as % of GDP; 
calculated by multiplying the measure of overall budget responsiveness by annual output gaps. 
The U.S. federal government was first in passing bold discretionary measures, the 
estimated size of which is given in table 3 which does not include bail-out measures for the 
financial sector (IMF 2009, table 1). This was partly due to the fact that the U.S. recession 
started in December 2007, earlier than in most European countries (Economist 2009: 72).17
Table 3: Estimated Contribution of Discretionary Measures (as % of GDP)
2008 2009 2010 Total
France 0.0 0.7 0.7 1.4
Germany 0.0 1.5 2.0 3.5
Italy 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.3
Spain 1.9 2.3 n.a. 4.2
UK 0.2 1.4 -0.1 1.5
United States 1.1 2.0 1.8 4.9
Source: IMF (2009: Table 4)
Note: ‘The figures have been corrected for: (i) “below-the-line” operations that do not impact the fiscal 
balance; and (ii) the fact that in some countries part of the announced stimulus included measures that were 
already planned for.’ (IMF 2009: 13)
Given the pro-cyclical stance of state policies, it is noteworthy that the stimulus package 
devoted considerable resources to increase state spending on unemployment benefits in 
terms of compensation levels (by $25 per week), eligibility (eg to part-time workers) and 
duration (up to 18 months instead of 6 months).18 This is against the background that by 
December 2008, thirty states were bound to run out of funds for their employer-financed 
unemployment insurance, two (Indiana and Michigan) had already become insolvent 
(Herald Tribune 2009). States are then forced to restrict access, raise contributions from 
17 To get the contribution from both automatic stabilisation and discretionary measures, only the absolute 
numbers of table 2 should be added to the respective numbers of table 3. For instance, in 2009 Spain’s 
budget is estimated to contribute (2.1+2.3=) 4.4% to aggregate demand that would almost offset the output 
gap of 4.7%.
18 This is Title II of ARRA, the so-called ‘Assistance for Unemployed Workers and Struggling Families 
Act’. For a summary see http://www.naswa.org/recovery/ 
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employers or borrow from the federal government, the latter at a cost of 4.7% interest if not 
repaid within the fiscal year. To avoid pro-cyclical measures, the federal stimulus package 
of February 2009 created a new programme (Federal Additional Compensation) that offers 
interest-free loans to states until June 2010. In other words, the federal budget provides ad 
hoc emergency safety nets that are permanent entitlements in European welfare states. 
Inevitably, there were press reports about obvious pieces of pork (Washington Post 2009), 
hardly surprising when mayors all over the country submit almost 12,000 projects in 
anticipation of funding.-- What is noteworthy of the figures for Europe is the diversity of 
responses, contradicting the widely held belief that the fiscal framework imposes a one-
size-fits-all policy which is inevitably too timid. Discretionary measures in Spain and 
Germany were of comparable size to the United States as soon as the recession made itself 
felt.
 
3.2 Concerns about the dynamic of public debt
As regards the second question for attempts at reining in the long-term consequences of 
massive fiscal interventions: we see at the moment little effort in this regard in the U.S. 
while the EU is, at least in rhetoric, more cautious and restrained. Against the backdrop of 
a projected budget deficit of 12% in 2009 and almost 9% in 2010 (IMF 2009: table 6), the 
Obama administration still puts its emphasis on the accountability to the current taxpayer: 
‘[t]he President has made it clear that every taxpayer dollar spent on our economic 
recovery must be subject to unprecedented levels of transparency and accountability’.19 In 
the EU, the governments of big member states propose to wait for the outcome of the first 
wave of fiscal interventions and to shift attention to coordinated regulatory intervention, to 
the extent that the chief economist of the IMF has criticised them for being too concerned 
about their debt-to-GDP ratios (Blanchard 2009). Likewise, the Commission keeps on 
emphasizing that the maxim of all interventions must be to avoid negative spillovers, and 
that the revised Stability Pact provides flexibility and guidance for a ‘timely, targeted, 
temporary and co-ordinated’ demand stimulus to the tune of 1.5% of EU GDP (CEC 2008: 
8). The Commission recommended on 24 March to open an EDP against countries which 
had an excessive deficit in 2008 already, France, Greece, Ireland, and Spain, and to reach a 
Council decision on the UK’s insufficient efforts to rein in projected budget deficits of 
around 10% for 2009/10. The press statement [IP /09/458] stresses that member states 
‘rightly adopted’ discretionary measures but that the SGP should be seen as a framework 
for an ‘exit strategy’ from rapidly increasing debt burdens.
This difference in rhetorical emphasis does not, however, translate into systematic 
differences on the substance of stimulus measures. As table 4 reveals, all packages 
combine temporary expenditure increases with largely permanent revenue reductions; with 
the exception of Italy, all support infrastructure investment, social safety nets and 
environmentally-friendly technology and reduce personal income taxes. None has 
announced to increase public employment. That is, we can discern a clear attempt to avoid 
lasting expenditure increases, a startling optimism that tax revenues can be cut 
permanently, but no big difference as regards either between advanced OECD countries 
(treating Italy admittedly as a dysfunctional outlier). 
19At URL: http://www.recovery.gov/?q=content/accountability-and-transparency 
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Table 4: Types of Stimulus Measures, 2008-2010 (as announced by 28 February 2009)
FR GE IT SP UK US
Expenditure measures 
Infrastructure investment T T T S T
Support for SMEs T
Social safety nets T T T T T T
Housing/construction support T T T T
Strategic industries support T T
Public employment
Other (green technology subsidies etc) T T T T T
Revenue measures
Corporate tax reduction/ depreciation P P/T P
Personal income tax reduction T P P P P
Indirect tax reduction (VAT etc) P S S
Other P
Source: IMF (2009: Table 5)
T: Temporary measures (with explicit sunset provisions or time-bound spending)
S: Self-reversing measures (measures whose costs are recouped by compensatory measures in future years)
P: Permanent measures (with recurrent fiscal costs)
3.3 Prevention of discrimination and protectionism
Finally, the problem of negative spillovers from states’ crisis management is tackled very 
differently by the two fiscal unions. In the U.S., it depends almost entirely on the 
generosity of federal budget support to what extent counterproductive state measures are 
prevented. About half of the projected shortfalls of state budgets, to the tune of $250 billion 
through 2011, are covered by $135 billion federal grants and distributed on the basis of 
existing formulas (Scheppach 2009). These additional general funds20 primarily free up 
states’ matching funds for Medicaid and education which can then be re-programmed. In 
particular the Medicaid formula guarantees that federal funds go to states that are hardest 
hit by unemployment in the course of which individuals lose occupational health care 
insurance. Only a few small, energy-rich states seem to enjoy windfall gains this time 
(Scheppach 2009). What this indicates is the notorious tradeoff between generosity and 
targeting that all federal emergency relief encounters: since it has to go to all states, the less 
generous, the better targeted, but also the higher the pressure on states to engage in pro-
cyclical adjustment – and vice versa. 
The EU budget cannot provide generous support although it can target its meagre funds on 
particular countries or regions. Within the Economic Recovery Programme, the 
Commission offers additional transfers through the European Social Fund and the 
structural funds for infrastructure development but member states have to apply. While 
skeptics have reason to suspect that this is simply renaming already planned expenditure, 
the Commission claims that this makes additional funds available in the sense of easier 
access to the European Social Fund and of bringing forward the spending of structural 
funds within its multi-year financial framework (CEC 2008: 11-17).  Its negligible 
20 In contrast to the remaining $140 billion ARRA funds for states that go to specific programmes 
controlled by the federal government.
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contribution of about 0.3% of EU GDP means, however, that the Commission’s main 
contribution to crisis management consists of regulating budgetary emergency measures in 
member states. 
An immediate test for regulations to prevent negative externalities came in early October 
2008 when the Irish Parliament passed legislation to give a blanket guarantee for two years 
to all deposits and bonds held in six Irish banks, worth an estimated €400 billion. Greece 
followed suit. The British, French and German authorities protested vehemently against the 
discriminatory measures. Yet, a few days later Germany went on to guarantee savings in all 
banks operating in Germany and although this was deemed non-discriminatory by the 
Competition Commissioner (EUbusiness 2008), it raised the spectre of competitive bidding 
for savings and a spread of banking crises all over Europe. The Commission moved 
quickly and got, by mid-October, the agreement from the ECOFIN Council for an amended 
Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes21. It stipulates a minimum amount to be 
guaranteed (€100,000 at the end of 2009; possibly confined to 90% of the deposit) and 
accelerated pay-out (within 3 days rather than 3 months). The difference to the budgetary 
solution in the U.S. is telling: there the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation provides a 
nation-wide guarantee which precludes a destabilising competition for deposits. However, 
the Geithner-Summers plan to relieve banks from toxic assets, announced on 23 March 
2009, shows the problem that then arises: given the imperatives of crisis management, the 
executive seems to have felt that is should avoid parliamentary control of its bailout plan, it 
is designed as an off-balance operation because it is at risk of being turned down by 
Congress. Jeffrey Sachs portrayed the plan as an attempt at ‘raiding’ the FDIC that 
Congress must obstruct (Sachs 2009). 
A last revealing issue to contrast is the control of state aid. In the U.S., the Dormant 
Commerce Clause is the legal device that the Supreme Court has developed ever since the 
19th century to prohibit discriminatory and protectionist regulation by states in favour of the 
economic interests of its citizens (Redlich et al 2005: ch.5).22 This body of case law applies 
in areas that are not explicitly covered by the Commerce Clause which gives the federal 
government the power to regulate all areas relevant to interstate commerce. But there is an 
important exception to this dormant Commerce Clause: the ‘market participant exception’ 
says that when a state acts as a seller or buyer of goods and services, rather than as a 
market regulator, it may favour its own residents. The rationale for this exception to the 
Dormant Commerce Clause is contested. Regan (1986: 1193-1195) gives two reasons: the 
exception allows protection and discrimination whenever the state does not use traditional 
protectionist instruments, such as a tariff, and when the intervention involves spending of 
the states’ own funds because, in comparison to regulation and levying a tax, spending is 
less coercive and has an inherent limited tendency, even if protectionist in purpose. Case 
21 The draft directive is available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/guarantee/dgs_proposal_en.pdf 
22 Another is the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the Constitution. It prohibits 
discrimination against out-of-state citizens in the exertion of basic rights (privileges and immunities are 
‘activities which are “sufficiently basic to the livelihood of the nation”’ like freedon of speech or police 
protection) and does not apply to corporations which is why this clause is not prominent in the area of state 
aid (Redlich et al 2005: 136-138; Regan 1986: 1202-1206).-- I am grateful to Deborah Mabbett for alerting 
me to this body of legislation.
22
law has thus allowed states to buy from local providers only, waive taxes (ie forego 
revenue)  on new manufacturers locating in the state or require construction firms to hire 
local workers for state-funded building works. It is not surprising therefore that in the 
initial OMB guidelines of the stimulus plan, I could not find any explicit prohibition of 
states’ discriminatory use of federal grants.23 Activists like OMB Watch or the ‘Coalition 
for an Accountable Recovery’  have criticised that ‘[t]he guidance only requires the first 
subsequent recipient (the sub-recipient) of federal recovery money to report on the use of 
the funds. For example, if the federal Department of Transportation gives a grant to the 
state of Georgia to repair and build roads, and Georgia then gives some portion to the city 
of Atlanta for area roads, there would be no requirement for companies receiving contracts 
from the city to report on the use of the money or the number of jobs created.’ (OMB 
Watch 2009) Regulation tries to guard against waste and fraud but not against spending 
that privileges in-state residents. 
The state aid rules of the EU prescribe that public procurement must normally observe 
strict non-discrimination. Exceptions can be granted only if there is a justifiable public 
interest goal, in EU parlance a ‘horizontal’ objective such as environmental protection or 
social cohesion, in contrast to a sectoral objective, ie subsidizing employment in ailing 
industries (Blauberger 2009). These state aid rules were immediately tested when 
governments in France, Spain, Britain, Italy, Germany and Sweden rushed to the rescue of 
their national car industries (EUobserver 2009). State aid for, say, Opel in Germany or 
Vauxhall in Britain, both subsidiaries of GM, is as politicized in Europe as the rescue 
packages for the three big car industries in the U.S. The French government triggered a 
storm of protest in Central Eastern Europe when it initially conditioned its €6.5 billion 
support for Renault and Peugeot on the stipulation of no plant closures in France for five 
years, which would incentivise these firms to close plants in the Czech Republic instead 
(the French government withdrew the condition on 25 February). The Commission stepped 
in resolutely, presenting a Communication on guidelines for admissible support of the car 
industry.24 For instance, subsidies to households for scrapping their old car must not 
discriminate against any supplier but leave households the right to choose. Yet, given the 
heated atmosphere in which the regulatory state cannot thrive, the Commission had to be 
uncomfortably outspoken when presenting these guidelines on 25 February 2009: ‘We will 
not accept any economic nationalism, rather we will make a decisive use of the instruments 
at our disposal to combat such nationalism and we will also ensure that the competition 
rules are in force, both within and outside of the internal market.’ (Verheugen, quoted in: 
EUobserver 2009) Presumably to avoid a standoff with governments that regulators cannot 
win, it took to outspoken criticism of the industry for its failure to deal with long-term 
structural problems. The guidelines propose to limit aid to firms with liquidity problems 
that did not have well-known problems pre-dating the crisis, preferably through indirect 
measures that support consumer demand and make banks providing credit. But state aid 
23 There is no reference to ‘protection’ and only one reference to ‘discrimination’ which asks to distribute 
funds in accordance with the Civil Rights Act and other statutes that prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
ethnicity, gender, disability etc (OMB 2009: para.1.6)
24 See URL: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/automotive/pagesbackground/competitiveness/com_2009_0104.pdf , annexes 
and other documents can be found at URL: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/automotive/pagesbackground/competitiveness/index.htm.
23
rules regarding public guarantees or subsidised loans for the industry have also been 
relaxed for a limited time of 2-3 years.
3.4 Summary
The response to the ongoing crisis seems to confirm that the ‘fourth branch of government’ 
is indeed more developed in the EU than in the U.S. There is more reliance on regulation, if 
only for lack of a sizeable union budget, and automatic stabilisation in EU member states. 
Conspicuous federal activism, with the Treasury rather than the OMB in the helm, is at the 
centre of crisis management in the U.S., bringing distributive politics to the fore. European 
governments are also more concerned about the public debt consequences of crisis 
management and prefer a stronger focus on regulatory coordination to a joint stimulus plan. 
However, the scale of the stimulus measures in the EU and the U.S. is not as big as one 
would expect given media reports, and there is a considerable overlap in the concrete 
measures taken.25 Finally, crisis management in the EU is more sensitive to negative 
spillovers from discrimination and protectionism by states, eg with respect to deposit 
guarantees and rescue packages for the car industry. In the U.S., the federal budget is the 
risk manager of first resort, providing both, concerned mainly about fraud and waste in the 
devolved allocation of federal funds. All this is remarkable given that a severe crisis with 
its political drama is not the best environment for effective regulation, one might have 
expected that the EU regulatory state retreats for a while. Yet it has just about managed to 
stay low key and act effectively behind the scenes. Its fiscal surveillance also has not 
obstructed varied and decisive responses by member states, in line with their political 
priorities and perceived economic needs.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, I have argued that an EU regulatory state has effectively emerged in the area 
of fiscal policy while it is rudimentary in the U.S. where budgetary politics dominates. The 
reason for this was located in fundamental differences as regards the federal set-up and the 
budgetary control in the two unions. The U.S. has a strong federal level that requires 
countervailing protection for the political sovereignty of states; strong control rights vis-à-
vis the executive are exercised by legislatures. In the EU, a fourth branch of government, 
not a full-fledged government level with its own three branches, is allowed to remind the 
member states constantly of all matters of common concern and to exercise oversight over 
budgets parallel to national parliaments. Comparisons that treat the EU as an 
underdeveloped fiscal federation have a hard time to explain why member states accept 
much more intrusive federal inspection if the union level is at the same time fiscally so 
weak. My interpretation, in the tradition of Majone (1996), also suggests that the U.S. 
cannot develop a regulatory state in fiscal matters across governance levels without 
completely upsetting the balance of power between states and federal government in favour 
of the latter.
25 It is beyond the scope of this paper to explain fully why there is such a discrepancy between rhetoric and 
action. It has created the impression in the U.S. that Europe is freeriding on its stimulus while most 
Europeans feel they are drawn into cleaning up a mess that is primarily the responsibility of the U.S. From 
an economic point of view, one might also consider that European countries have more reason to be 
concerned about a weakening of their currencies and hence downplay their fiscal activism. By contrast, a 
strong and rapid devaluation of the dollar can become part of the solution, given that the U.S. is indebted in 
her own currency.
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Critics of the regulatory state may read this analysis as yet more evidence for how 
dangerous the EU is for the political sovereignty of member states or for the social taming 
of market processes. Yet, the contrast with the U.S. suggests that one can’t have it both 
ways. The protection of political sovereignty, to the point where state spending is allowed 
to discriminate openly in favour of residents, is easier to prioritise when social protection is 
much more limited than in the EU. Otherwise, the difference in the generosity of safety 
nets and in the ability to subsidize employment becomes a very divisive issue, both if 
discrimination is allowed (within limits) and if it is prohibited (with specified exceptions). 
This safeguard of political liberalism comes at the cost of less economic stability and social 
security. It induced the federal government now to strengthen social safety nets of the 
states in health, unemployment and education. 
The EU asks members to give up some political sovereignty and treat their spending 
decisions as a matter of common concern. Yet the states have not granted to the 
Commission what ultimately bestows sovereignty to a political entity, namely the right to 
tax and spend based on its own majoritarian legitimation. For that reason, member states 
can allow the very same body to be as intrusive as it can justify on economic grounds. The 
construction of good economic grounds is important in my view, because it promises (but 
obviously does not guarantee) that the constraints on political sovereignty and the 
infringement on the right to discriminating social protection can be weighed up against 
gains in economic stability and efficiency. 
The response to the financial crisis brought into sharp profile the strengths and weaknesses 
of either fiscal arrangement. In the U.S., it exposes the dependency of states and their 
economic stability on the federal budget. Crisis management hinges completely on how the 
drama of distributive politics plays itself out between the White House and Congress. Yet 
the federal government can mobilise enormous fiscal resources, internalises potential 
spillovers through centralisation and has a better chance to overcome coordination 
problems in its response. In the EU, the crisis exposes the fragile political foundation of 
solidarity in the union that is not helped by the unequal size and hence ability of countries 
to provide economic stability. Crisis management depends largely on big member states’ 
willingness to engage in constructive measures that benefit everybody, not only 
themselves. But the decentralised response allows for more tailored measures sensitive to 
heterogeneous political preferences, while the institutionalised venues of rational 
deliberation do force governments to argue their case and submit their plans for scrutiny. 
Given the unprecedented challenges that this crisis poses for every government, it seems 
only fair to say that both the United States and the EU have proven their ability to act, 
albeit in very different ways. 
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